17s delivered to the Charleston wing by midnight New Year's Eve. The 12th plane was delivered to the Air Force on Dec. 22, but because an earlier plane was being modified, this made only 11 operational planes on the flight line at Charleston.

Modification crews began working around the clock after Christmas to meet the delivery deadline and finished on the afternoon of Dec. 31. The Air Force accepted delivery of the modified plane at 6:25 p.m.

Because of past problems with cost overruns and production delays, the C–17 program is on probation with the Department of Defense. The government has committed to buying 40 planes, and will make a decision in November whether to order up to an additional 80. An important consideration in making the decision will be how well the C–17 performs this July during a 30-day test called a ''reliability, maintainability and availability'' evaluation.

[Department of Defense News Release]

FIRST C–17 SQUADRON DECLARED OPERATIONAL

The commander of the Air Force's Air Mobility Command declared the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of the first C–17 Globemaster III squadron today. Gen. Robert L. Rutherford's decision is a significant milestone for America's newest airlifter. It means the 17th Airlift Squadron, assigned to the 437th Airlift Wing, and the Air Force Reserve's 317th Airlift Squadron, assigned to the 315th Airlift Wing, both at Charleston Air Force Base, S.C., will officially begin flying operational AMC ''Global Reach'' missions.

The first C–17 arrived at Charleston AFB in June 1993. By December 1994, the 437th was fully equipped with a fleet of 12 aircraft and 48 crews. The 12 aircraft will be shared with the Air Force Reserve unit. Together, both active duty and reserve aircrews have already demonstrated the C–17's ability to airlift personnel and equipment with missions to Southwest Asia, Central America and the Caribbean basin.

IOC declaration is a major step in modernizing the nation's strategic airlift fleet. The C–17, designed to replace the aging C–141 Starlifter fleet as the nation's core airlift aircraft, combines the best features of older airlifters within a single airframe. The C–17 is about the size of the C–141, but can carry twice the Starlifter's payload. It can also carry outsized equipment strategic distances like the C–5 Galaxy, yet land on airstrips normally accessible only to the C–130 Hercules.

Built by McDonnell Douglas at Long Beach, Calif., the C–17 can carry 160,000 pounds of cargo, unrefueled, 2,400 nautical miles at a cruise speed of 450 knots. With a maximum payload of 169,000 pounds, the aircraft is designed to carry every air transportable piece of equipment in the U.S. Army inventory, from Patriot air defense missile batteries and Bradley fighting vehicles to M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks.

The C–17 can be aerial refueled, land on airstrips as short as 3,000 feet, back up, rapidly offload cargo, and is designed to airdrop equipment, cargo or paratroopers. The aircraft completed developmental testing of these capabilities on Dec. 16, 1994. During these tests, the C–17 set 21 world performance records in three weight classes of the heavy aircraft category and one additional world record in the short takeoff and landing category.

The Air Force has contracted to buy 40 C–17s from McDonnell Douglas. A Defense Acquisition Board decision on extending the buy beyond 40 aircraft is scheduled for November 1995.

[Air Mobility Command Media Release]

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The Air Force has contracted to buy 40 C–17s from McDonnell Douglas. A Defense Acquisition Board decision on extending the buy beyond 40 is scheduled for November 1995. Based on demonstrated improvements in aircraft and contractor performance, a favorable decision is expected, thus fulfilling America's requirement for strategic airlift.

STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF LEGISLATION TO AMEND THE FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT

HON. NORMAN D. DICKS

OF WASHINGTON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, January 30, 1995

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to introduce legislation today which will make small changes in the current Federal Advisory Committee Act [FACA] statute, but will have significant and important consequences for those the bill is intended to provide relief.

Specifically, my bill will limit the application of FACA with regard to meetings held Federal officials and representatives of State, county, local governments, and Indian tribes. This will enable Federal representatives to proceed with legitimate contact with local governmental officials and tribes for purposes of implementing cooperative programs such as the President's forest plan.

In the Pacific Northwest, we have been moving forward diligently in an effort to implement the President's forest plan, particularly with regard to economic assistance to dislocated workers, businesses, and timber-dependent communities. The Northwest was hit very hard by the listing of the northern spotted owl as a threatened species. The owl's listing and subsequent injunctive relief ordered by the courts reduced harvest levels in the region on Federal lands by over 80 percent.

The $1.2 billion promised through the forest plan is a key means to mitigate for job losses, mill closures, and associated impacts from reductions in timber harvest. However, in order to ensure that the forest plan's economic assistance reaches those individuals and communities it is intended to reach, there must be involvement by local and county officials in the planning process for these funds.

Currently, an unintended consequence of FACA is that it makes it difficult for Federal officials to meet with local governmental officials and tribes to plan for the dissemination of economic assistance. However, the FACA problem isn't simply limited to the use of the economic assistance, it also creates problems for elements of the plan such as adaptive management areas, which hinge on local and community input in order to be effective.

Numerous States and counties in the West have expressed concern with the current FACA law, and its unintended prohibition of official contact between Federal officials and legitimate representatives of tribes and local governments. Concern never intended FACA to prohibit legitimate and appropriate contact in order to carry out Federal objectives that require interaction at the State and local levels.

These changes will make FACA more reasonable, tolerant, and palatable. The bill will help ensure the smooth implementation of the President's forest plan, but will also aide other States who have similarly expressed concerns with the current FACA statute.

I urge my colleagues support for this important legislation.

NUCLEAR TERRORISM JURISDICTION EXTENSION AND CONTROL ACT, H.R. 730

HON. BENJAMIN A. GILMAN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, January 30, 1995

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, today, I introduce another in a series of legislative proposals intended to strengthen America's defenses against the terrorist threat. I am particularly pleased to introduce the Nuclear Terrorism Jurisdictional Extension and Control Act of 1995, H.R. 730.

This bill is an important step in our Nation's continuing and aggressive battle against international terrorism. It is especially important as relates to the latest and most alarming possibility, the nuclear terrorist threat.

Since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, we are all familiar with the many news reports of that region, and in Europe on the possible black market sale of cold war missile nuclear material. The most recent account involved the arrests of smugglers and the seizure of almost three kilograms—6.6 pounds—of highly enriched uranium in the Czech Republic last December. This is a new challenge that cannot be ignored by either our allies in the region, or ourselves.

The serious threat these new black market nuclear material sales pose, especially when made by common criminals, or organized crime figures from the former Soviet Union, possibly even to terrorists, or other unsavory individuals, is something to be taken seriously.

We, here in the United States must act now, in order to be prepared for this new and possibly deadly nuclear challenge, before it is too late. We need to give our U.S. law enforcement agencies all the tools and authority they will need to fight this emerging new nuclear material criminal threat.

The American law enforcement community needs new tools and statutory authority, especially following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the long-established strict state nuclear material controls, which once existed in the region. Controls and nuclear material stability, which today we can no longer take for granted or count on in many instances. The chances for trafficking in these nuclear materials is much greater today in light of these developments and the breakdown in traditional controls and state security arrangements in the region.

While there is no need to panic, we must be prepared to act responsibly to insure that the United States can meet any nuclear material criminal threat, especially from terrorists, if one were to materialize. I note that the Secretary of State Mr. Christopher himself in an interview with the Washington Times on January 17, 1995, addressed some of the concerns over the nuclear material problem in the former Soviet Union, and the terrorist threat. While noting that the military facilities in the region maybe relatively safe from nuclear proliferation problems, unlike civilian laboratories, he went on to say ''That's a problem for the entire world. It's a problem that we focus on in Russia because it has a great deal of this nuclear material.''

Accordingly, we must review and revise our own criminal laws directed at the threat from the newest nuclear proliferation, especially in this unstable black market criminal climate in Eastern Europe today, where everything and anything, may be for sale. We must meet these new circumstances and challenges, many have not anticipated, nor even scarcely envisioned, just a few years ago.

After review it is evident to me and others that there are some loopholes in U.S. criminal laws in this area that must be closed as soon as possible. In order to be prepared for such a new and more deadly threat, which no one could ever have imagined before the end of the cold war, we must act now and have our Federal criminal laws meet the new challenges.

The bill I am introducing today, starts the process. It makes needed changes to help address this whole unanticipated new area of the criminal law and activity involving the unauthorized trade in dangerous nuclear materials for criminal purposes, including possible terrorism.

This criminal threat, including this new phenomena of black market dealings in dangerous nuclear materials, requires even greater cooperation and international efforts by our law enforcement agencies in this post-cold-war era. Law enforcement both here and abroad, must be given the tools and authority in this new area of the criminal law to do the job, and protect all our citizens, whether at home or while they are abroad from a new nuclear threat.

The bill I am introducing today provides the Attorney General and the FBI the necessary long arm jurisdiction to reach nuclear based crimes targeted against Americans anywhere in the world if the victim is the U.S. Government, an American citizen, or an American company; or alternatively, if those committing the offense are either U.S. citizens or U.S. companies, they are covered as well. The location of the offense in such circumstances anywhere in the world should not be a bar to U.S. jurisdiction over these crimes that may well threaten international stability and order today. The threat in such cases justifies this extraordinary criminal remedy.

The bill also adds new forms of nuclear material to the coverage of our criminal laws as relates to prohibited transactions in explosives and dangerous materials, particularly nuclear byproduct material. It closes any possible loopholes under which those black market criminals might claim protection under U.S. law with regard to these dangerous nuclear materials, for example byproduct materials, including certain radioactive isotopes created in the operation of a nuclear reactor or accelerator, source, and/or other special nuclear materials.

If these criminals may be dealing in, or contemplating dealing in such dangerous nuclear related materials in this unstable and uncertain time in the former Soviet Union, they will be covered by United States law under my new bill. Any possible loophole, will be closed.

Accordingly I urge my colleagues to support this urgently needed legislation. I invite my colleagues to join me in helping American law enforcement take on the newest dangers from the nuclear terrorist threat, which we must face in this new and sometimes more dangerous, post-cold-war era.

I ask that the full text of this bill be printed at this point in the RECORD.

H.R. 730

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ''Nuclear Terrorism Jurisdiction Extension and Control Act of 1995''.

SEC. 2. NUCLEAR TERRORISM JURISDICTION.

(a) EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.—Paragraph (2) of section 831(c) of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

''(2) one of the persons who committed, or is charged with committing, the offense is a United States person, or the offense is committed against a governmental entity or a United States person;''.

(b) DEFINITION OF UNITED STATES PERSON.—Section 832(f) of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (3) and inserting ''; and''; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

''(4) the term 'United States person' means.—

''(A) a national of the United States (as defined in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act); or

''(B) a corporation organized under the laws of the United States, or of any State, district, commonwealth, territory or possession of the United States.''.

(c) CLARIFICATION OF COVERED TYPES OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL.—Section 831(f)(2) of title 18, United States Code, is amended.—

(1) by striking ''or'' at the end of subparagraph (C);

(2) by striking ''and'' at the end of subparagraph (D); and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

''(E) byproduct material, source material, or special nuclear material, as such terms are defined in section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; and''.

INTRODUCTION OF TEAMWORK FOR EMPLOYEES AND MANAGERS ACT

HON. STEVE GUNDERSON

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, January 30, 1995

Mr. GUNDERSON. Mr. Speaker, one of the visible issues in the 104th Congress is how we as a nation can develop and maintain a competitive, motivated, and involved workforce. This is particularly important today because we now live and compete in the global market. As the global market has expanded, successful American companies of all types have learned that cooperation between employees and managers is vital to staying competitive both domestically and internationally.

Unfortunately, the employee involvement programs across the country are legally threatened. Under the National Labor Relations Act, employee involvement programs have been disbanded because of inconsistencies between the purposes of the act when written, and the realities of the modern workplace. Two recent decisions by the National Labor Relations Board in particular, the Electromation and DuPont decisions, refocused attention on the act, calling into question virtually every current employee involvement program in the Nation.

WHAT ARE EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT PROGRAMS?

Employee involvement [EI] programs have no set formula or structure, although they are referred to by many different names—quality circles, self-managed work teams, employee involvement committees, etc. Flexibility is essential. It allows employers and employees to construct a program which makes the most sense in the context of their particular workplace.

Through involvement programs, employees voice their opinions in the decisionmaking